Yuriy V. Ivlev abstract. Quasi-matrix logic is based on the generalization of the principles of classical logic: bivalency (a proposition take values from the domain {t (truth), f (falsity)}); consistency (a proposition can not take on both values); excluded middle (a proposition necessarily takes some of these values); identity (in a complex proposition, a system of propositions, an argument the same proposition takes the same value from domain {t, f }); matrix principle -logical connectives are defined by matrices. As a result of our generalization, we obtain quasi-matrix logic principles: 
Kalmar's method
Well-known proof method for methateorem of semantic completeness of classical propositional calculus, which may be also treated as an approach to the solution of the decision problem, implies the proof of the following lemma: (⇒ is here a sign (symbol) for logical entailment, ¬ -for negation, t и f -truth and falsity, respectively.)
2 Generalization of Kalmar's method for many-valued matrix logic
At the end of the sixties of the 20-th century I was able to generalize this method for functionally complete many-valued matrix logics.
(Probably the generalization of this kind had been done earlier by somebody else, but I have not heard of it up to now.) Let's illustrate the basic principles underlying the generalization with one of the system of modal logic Sb − constructed by me.
Logical terms of language: ¬, ⊃, 2, ♢. ('⊃', '2', '♢' -are respectively signs for implication, necessity and possibility)
Semantics Definitions of logical terms
⊃ t n t c f i f c t n t n t c f i f c t c t n t c f c f c f i t n t n t n t n f c t n t c t c t c
t n , t c , f c , f i -are respectively truth-values 'necessary truth', 'contingent truth', 'contingent falsity', 'necessary falsity'. Designated values are t n and t c .
Formalisation
The calculus includes schemes of axioms of classical propositional calculus, modus ponens rule of inference and also following schemes of axioms: Let us substitute assumption 2a i+1 with number i + 1 from the set of assumptions A 1 , ..., A n for the set of formulas a i+1 , ¬♢¬a i+1 , assumption a i+1 &♢¬a i+1 for the set of formulas ♢¬a i+1 , a i+1 , assumption ¬a i+1 &♢a i+1 for the set of formulas ¬a i+1 , ♢a i+1 , assumption ¬♢a i+1 for the set of formulas ¬a i+1 , ¬♢a i+1 . Then all assumptions with number i + 1 may be eliminated. In my doctoral thesis I brought forward 30 problems calling for solution. Later these ideas were published in monograph [8, p. 208-217] . Many of these problems have been solved by now. The solutions were published in 13 PhD theses and publications. Some of the problems have not been solved yet. One of these problems (problem number 9) If a function is a correspondence in virtue of which an object from some (functional) domain is related with certain object (from the range of the function) then a quasi-function is a correspondence in virtue of which an object from a certain subset of some set is related with some object from a certain subset of some or another set (from the range of the quasi-function).
Illustration

Examples
2 and 4 are two-and four-place (respectively ) metalinguistic exclusive disjunctions. Let us assume that disjunction may be degenerative, i. e. in this particular case quasi-function is just a function. Then a matrix is a particular case of quasi-matrix.
In the general case an object of application of a quasi-function, as well as truth-value of a quasi-function, are indefinite. Only subrange of the range of quasi-function, which includes this object, and sub-range of the range of values of a quasi-function, which contains a value of a quasi-function, are defined.
Such vagueness may be of a cognitive nature. It takes place, when the above-mentioned correspondence or relation is objectively functional, but this is not known to the researcher. For example, there are three probable variants of translation of a certain word in a dictionary, but the translator doesn't know, which of these three readings is the most appropriate in the present case (context). Such situations also appear in systems of automatic translation.
Another cause of indetermination is that reality may be indeterminate itself. For example, for planning of a production we have to take into account the following reasons. Suppose that we know the limits of alteration of a quantity of raw stuff, which will be factored next year. But it s impossible to figure out any rigid link between definite quantity of a factored raw stuff and a quantity of output, even if we knew a quantity of man-power, equipment etc.
For the first time some particular examples of quasi-functions were represented by H. Reichenbach (1932, 1935, 1936) , Z. Zavarski (1936), F. Gonseth (1938, 1941) , N. Rescher (1962 Rescher ( , 1964 Rescher ( , 1965 Rescher ( , 1969 ). Rescher considers a material implication and defines it as follows:
is not a determinate truth-values. This bracketed entry (t, f ) means that either one of these two truth-values may occur in the various particular cases. Hence, depending on specific sense of propositions, the whole implication may be either true or false. Other logical terms are formulated in a usual way.
It is obvious that not all tautologies of a classical propositional logic of the form A ⊃ B take the truth-value 't' under any given assignment of truth-values to elementary propositions.
Rescher formulates the conception of quasi-tautology. He adopts t and (t, f ) in his quasi-functional system Q as designated truthvalues. Then quasi-tautology is a formula which invariably does or can take either of this designated truth-values for every assignment of truth-values to its propositional variables. But if we bring to a logical end Rescher's reasoning we also have to treat as a quasitautology propositional variable p.
Then Rescher 'corrects' definitions of Lukasiewicz' three-valued logic.
Independently of the above-mentioned and some other authors I came to the same considerations at the end of the sixties / beginning of the seventies. My ideas were concerned with the way of modal logic development. Though by that time a lot of different 'logical systems' had been constructed, it wasn't clear, what kind of modal operators and notions (either factual or logical necessity, possibility etc.) were defined by these systems. It made the application of modal systems to the natural reasoning analysis very difficult. This condition of modal logic seemed to me unsatisfactory and inadequate. On purpose to overcome these difficulties I distinguished two different branches of modal logical investigations: proper logic (or logic itself) and an imitation of logic. Proper logic deals with the forms of thoughts. H. Curry called this kind of logic a philosophical one. Imitation of logic is a certain (formal) system, e. g. algebraic system, which in some respect resembles philosophical logic (usually with respect to some technical symbols and signs) [15] .
In the following explanations I am treating modern logic as a philosophical logic in the sense of Curry.
In logic, as well as in each other science, it's possible to distinguish empirical and theoretical levels of development. An essential feature of a theory is its ability to explain phenomena. As I think, my approach to the analysis of logical modalities, elaborated by N. Arkhiereev, possesses this ability. Theory of factual modalities, which is to be based on quasi-matrix logic, has not been yet completely developed. (Fundamental ideas of theory of logical modalities are represented in [1, 2, 6, 7, 13, 14] .) I began to work out quasi-matrix logic with constructing the system of minimal modal logic.
Minimal modal logic S min
(Symbols of formalised language: 2, ♢, ¬, ⊃).
Lukasiewicz's well-known statement about impossibility of proper definitions of modal operators 'necessary (2) and 'possibly' (♢) in terms of 'truth' and 'falsity' is valid only if these operators are interpreted as functions.
But if we interpret modal operators as quasi-functions, it becomes possible to define them in above-mentioned terms.
Let's consider formula 2A. Assume A takes value f (falsehood). Then formula 2A also takes value f , since not-existing state of affairs can not be necessary (both logically and factually). Assume formula A takes value t (truth). What truth-value takes formula 2A in this case? The value is indeterminate. Formula 2A takes either value t, or value f . Let's notify this situation by t/f .
By the same reasoning, we can conclude that truth-value of the formula ♢A is indeterminate, when formula A takes value f . Definitions of signs of negation and implication are usual. Designated truth-value is t. S min -formalism which is adequate to the system constructed semantically. S min -calculus is an extension of a classical propositional calculus with added new axiom schemes: 2A ⊃ A, A ⊃ ♢A. S min -calculus is weaker than basic modal logic of Lukasiewicz, since the formula 2A ≡ ¬♢¬A is not provable there.
For the proof of semantic completeness meta-theorem of S mincalculus, we define alternative interpretation as follows.
Alternative interpretation is a function || || such as to: If P ispropositional variable then ||P || ∈ {t, f }.
If ||A|| and ||B|| are defined, then Formula is satisfiable iff it takes the value 'true' in some alternative interpretation. Formula is valid iff it is true under each alternative interpretation.
Four-valued quasi-matrix logical systems
Truth-values t n , t c , f c , f i are interpreted as follows: proposition taking values t n describes a state of affairs which takes place in reality and which is strictly determined by certain circumstances; proposition taking values t c describes a state of affairs which takes place in reality and which is not strictly determined by either circumstances; proposition taking values f c describes a state of affairs which doesn't exist in reality and the absence of which is not strictly determined by either circumstances; proposition taking values f i describes a state of affairs which doesn't exist in reality and which absence is strictly determined by certain circumstances.
Four-valued quasi-matrix logic based on the following generalization of classical logic principles.
Classical logic principles
Quasi-matrix logic principles (1) the principle of bivalency (propositions take values from the domain {t (truth), f (falsity)}) Logical terms are the same as those in the S min -system. The following considerations underlie the above-stated definitions of logical terms. Let us consider formula 22A. If the subformula A takes value t, then the value of a formula 2A, as it has already been settled, is not determined, i. e. situation which is described by A takes place in reality but is determined itself either strictly or not. In the first case we have to assign to the formula 2A value t, in the second one -the value f .
Definitions of logical terms:
I.e. in the first case a proposition A is interpreted as being true and (factually) necessary (in our terms it takes value t n ). What value in this case takes formula 22A? If A describes a state of affairs which is strictly determined by any circumstances, then these circumstances may in its own turn be either determined or not by some others. That is formula 2A also takes value t n (or t c ) etc.
Such situations occur both in subjective and objective reality. Different kinds of distinct and fuzzy determination in biology were considered by V.Yu. Ivlev in [5, 6] .
Semantic-constructed systems are formalized by a number of calculi including as their general part all schemes of axioms of a classical propositional calculus, modus ponens -rule of inference and following schemes of axioms:
We sign with letter S the calculus, which is obtained from classic propositional calculus by means of above-stated eight model schemes of axioms. The calculi corresponding to the semanticconstructed systems may be worked out by addition to S of the following schemes of axioms:
Calculi Sc, Sd, Se, Sf, Sg, Sh, Si include schemes of axioms
Calculi, which have the same lower case letter occurring in the names (e. g. calculi Sc − , Sc, Sc + ), differ from calculi, which have other lower case letters occurring in the names (e. g. calculi Si − , Si, Si + ), by sets of schemes of axioms
The other additional schemes of axioms of these calculi are the same:
Calculi Sc − , Sc, Sc
We use the rule of substitution of ¬¬A with A and visa versa. For the proof of metatheorem of semantic completeness of calculi Sb − , Sc − , Sd − , Se − (semantics for these calculi are of matrix sort) the following lemma is proved. D is a formula, a 1 , . .., a n are all different variables, occurring in D, b 1 , ..., b n -values b 1 , ..., b n variables a 1 , ..., a n . Then A 1 , . .., A n ⇒ D ′ .(⇒ is here a sign for entailment.)
Lemma 3. Assuming that
Lemma is proved by the use of recurrent mathematical induction.
Semantics for others calculi are quasi-matrix (proper). For the proof of metatheorem of semantic completeness of these calculi the notion of alternative interpretation is used. We have the following definition of alternative interpretation for Sa + -system.
Alternative interpretation is a function || || satisfying the following:
If P is -propositional variable then ||P || ∈ {t n , t c ,
S r -three-valued quasi-matrix logic. (Symbols of formalised language are the same.) n, c, i -values of S r -system -which are interpreted respectively as 'necessary', 'contingently', 'impossibly'. State of affairs is necessary if and only if (iff) it is distinctly determined by certain circumstances; state of affairs is contingent, iff neither its existence nor its absence is not strictly determined by some circumstances; state of affairs is impossible iff its absence is strictly determined by some circumstances. Actually, here and above the evaluations of state of affairs concern (to) propositions. (To my regret, I couldn't find proper terms for evaluation of propositions.)
S r -logic is based on the following generalizations of principles of classic logic.
Classical logic principles
Principles of quasi-matrix logic Sr (1) the principle of bivalency the principle of three-valency (propositions take values from the domain {n, c, i}) (2) the principle of consistency consistency: can not have more than one value from {n, c, i} (3) the principle of excluded middle the principle of excluded fourth (4) the principle of identity Identity (in a complex proposition, a system of propositions, an argument one and the same proposition has one and the same value from the domain {n, c, i}) (5) the matrix principle the quasi-matrix principle (logical terms are interpreted as quasifunctions) 
Definitions of logical terms:
The formalisation and the proof of the meta-theorem of semantic completeness are the same as they were stated above.
Some peculiar properties of this logical system
First of all, it allows the use of the rule A ⇒ 2A.
Besides, all derivable rule of inference of a classical propositional calculus are applicable to modalized formulas only. Some (at least some) direct rules of inference of a classical propositional calculus are also applicable to non-modalized formulas, for example: A ∨ B, ¬A ⇒ B; but such indirect rules as rule of deduction:
and rule reductio ad absurdum
are not applicable to non-modalized formulas in derivation. However, so-called weakened rule of reductio ad absurdum
is applicable to any formula in derivation. 
Proof. Lemma is proved by the use of recurrent mathematical induction.
Basis of induction. D does not contain any logical terms. Proof is obvious.
Assumption of induction. Proof holds for the formulas, containing k (k ≤ n) occurrences of logical terms.
Step of induction. Proof holds for the formulas containing n + 1 occurrences of logical terms.
Case 1. n + 1-th occurrence of the logical terms is the occurrence of the sign of negation. Formula D is ¬B.
Suppose formula D takes value t in all alternative interpretations, formed on the basis of some initial interpretation. Then B takes value f in all these alternative interpretations. Вy the assumption of induction A 1 , ..., A n ⇒ ¬B.
Suppose formula D takes value f in all alternative interpretations, formed on the basis of some initial interpretation. Then B takes value t in all these alternative interpretations and by the assumption of induction
Under the third possibility A 1 , ..., A n ⇒ ¬B ∨ ¬¬B. Case 2. n + 1-th occurrence of the logical terms is the occurrence of the sign of necessity. Formulа D is 2B. Suppose B takes value f in all alternative interpretations, formed on the basis of some initial interpretation. Then by the assumption of induction A 1 , ..., A n ⇒ ¬B. Since ¬B ⊃ ¬2B is a theorem scheme (contraposition of axiom scheme 2B ⊃ B), then A 1 , ..., A n ⇒ ¬2B. If B takes value t in all or some alternative interpretations, then formula 2B takes value t in some alternative interpretations and in some other alternative interpretations it takes value f . Then it is obvious that A 1 , ..., A n ⇒ 2B ∨ ¬2B.
Case 3. n + 1-th occurrence of the logical terms is the occurrence of the sign of possibility. Formula D is ♢B. Suppose B takes value t in all alternative interpretations, formed on the basis of some initial interpretation. Вy the assumption of induction A 1 , ..., A n ⇒ B. Since B ⊃ ♢B is a theorem , A 1 , ..., A n ⇒ ♢B. If B takes value f in all or some alternative interpretations, then formula ♢B takes value t in some alternative interpretations and it takes value f in some other alternative interpretations. Then A 1 , ..., A n ⇒ ♢B ∨ ¬♢B.
Case 4. n + 1-th occurrence of the logical terms is the occurrence of the sign of implication. Formula D is B ⊃ C. If formula D under above-mentioned truth-assignments of its variables takes value t in some alternative interpretations and in some other alternative interpretations it takes value f , then
It is possible if in every alternative interpretation formula B takes value t and formula C takes value f . Вy the assumption of induction for every alternative interpretation holds that A 1 , ..., A n ⇒ B  and A 1 , ..., A n ⇒ ¬C. Consequently A 1 , ..., A n ⇒ ¬(B ⊃ C) . Let's take into consideration the last case, then D takes value t in every alternative interpretation. It means that in every alternative interpretation formula B takes value f or formula C takes value t. Hence by the assumption of induction,
Analyzing all possible cases we conclude: .., a n in all alternative interpretations, formed on the basis of some initial interpretation; suppose D ′ is 2D ∨ (♢D&♢¬D), 2D ∨ ¬♢D, (♢D&♢¬D) ∨ ¬♢D, (2D ∨ (♢D&♢¬D)) ∨ ¬♢D, depending on whether D takes, respectively, value n in some alternative interpretations and in some other alternative interpretations it takes value c; D takes value n in some alternative interpretations and in some others it takes value i; D takes value c in some alternative interpretations and in some others it takes value i; D takes value n in some alternative interpretations or it takes value c in some other alternative interpretations, or it takes value i in some other alternative interpretations. Then
The substitution of the same kind is possible in case of other values in different alternative interpretations. I.e, logical entailment is based on alternative interpretations formed on the basis of some initial interpretation. For example, if formula takes value n in every alternative interpretation, then the following holds for these alternative interpretations 'A 1 , ..., A n ⇒ 2D i or A 1 , ..., A n ⇒ 2D i , or  A 1 , ..., A n ⇒ 2D i '. Hence A 1 , . .., A n ⇒ 2D i . Note that if there is no any ambiguity the only alternative interpretation that is possible is the initial one. In this case A 1 , . .., A n ⇒ 2D i also holds. The same holds for the other values.
Proof. Lemma is proved by recurrent mathematical induction on the number of occurrences of logical terms in formula D.
Step of induction. Case 1. Formula D is ¬B. Suppose D takes value n in every alternative interpretation formed on the basis of some initial interpretation. Then B takes value i in every alternative interpretation formed on the basis of this initial interpretation. Вy the assumption of induction A 1 , ..., A n ⇒ ¬♢B. ¬♢B ⊃ 2¬B is a theorem scheme. (Using theorem scheme
Suppose D takes value i in every alternative interpretation formed on the basis of some initial interpretation. Then B takes value n in every alternative interpretation. By the assumption of induction A 1 , ..., A n ⇒ 2B. Then A 1 , ..., A n ⇒ ¬♢¬B. Here we use the axiom scheme ♢A ⊃ ¬2¬A and the rule of substitution of ¬¬A for A and vice versa.
Suppose D takes value c in every alternative interpretation formed on the basis of some initial interpretation. Тhen B also takes value c in every alternative interpretation. Вy the assumption of induction
Suppose D takes value n in some alternative interpretations and it takes value c in some others. By the assumption of induction: A 1 , ..., A n ⇒ ¬♢B or A 1 , ..., A n ⇒ ♢B&♢¬B. Since in the first case A 1 , ..., A n ⇒ 2¬B and in the second one A 1 , ..., A n ⇒ (♢¬B&♢¬¬B), the following holds:
For other possible cases proof is analogous.
Suppose D takes value n in every alternative interpretation formed on the basis of some initial interpretation. Тhen B also takes value n in every alternative interpretation. By the assumption of induction A 1 , ..., A n ⇒ 2B. Then A 1 , . .., A n ⇒ 22B. (Using axiom scheme 2A ⊃ 22A.)
Suppose D takes value i in every alternative interpretation formed on the basis of some initial interpretation. Тhen B takes value i in every alternative interpretation, or it takes value c in every alternative interpretation, or it takes value i in some alternative interpretation and it takes value c in some another alternative interpretation. Under the last possibility by the assumption of induction If formula D takes different truth values in different alternative interpretations the proof may be concluded from the above-analyzed cases.
Сase 3. Formula D is ♢B. Suppose D takes value n in every alternative interpretation formed on the basis of some initial interpretation. Тhen B takes value n in every alternative interpretation, or it takes value c in every alternative interpretation, or it takes value n in some alternative interpretation and it takes value c in another alternative interpretation. Under the last possibility by the assumption of induction Сase 4. n + 1-th occurrence of the logical terms is the occurrence of the sign of implication. Formula D is B ⊃ C.
Suppose D takes value n in every alternative interpretation formed on the basis of some initial interpretation. It is possible if B takes value i in every alternative interpretation or C takes value n in every alternative interpretation. Вy the assumption of induction for every alternative interpretation holds:
Suppose D takes value i in every alternative interpretation formed on the basis of some initial interpretation. It is possible if B takes value n in every alternative interpretation and C takes value i in every alternative interpretation. Вy the assumption of induction for every alternative interpretation holds:
Suppose D takes value c in every alternative interpretation formed on the basis of some initial interpretation. It is possible if B takes value n and C takes value c in every alternative interpretation or B takes value c and C takes value i in every alternative interpretation. In the first case A 1 , ..., A n ⇒ 2B and A 1 , ..., A n ⇒ ♢C&♢¬C. Then we have to prove:
and ¬2¬A ⊃ ♢A, and rule of substitution of ¬¬A for A and vice versa). In second case A 1 , ..., A n ⇒ ♢B&♢¬B, and
Suppose D takes value n in some alternative interpretation formed on the basis of some initial interpretation and it takes value c in another interpretation. Then we have to prove: Тhen A 1 , . .., A n ⇒ ♢(B ⊃ C) (using axiom scheme ♢B ⊃ ♢ (A ⊃ B) ).
The proof of other possibilities may be concluded from the aboveanalyzed cases. Suppose D is a formula, a 1 , . .., a n are all different variables, occurring in D, b 1 , . .., b n are truth-values of these variables; let be 2D, D&♢¬D, ¬♢D or ¬D&♢D, depending  on whether D takes value t n , t c , f i or f c with values b 1 , ..., b n of the  variables a 1 , . .., a n in all alternative interpretations formed on the basis of some initial interpretation. Suppose D ′ is 2D ∨ (D&♢¬D), 2D ∨ ¬♢D, (D&♢¬D) ∨ ¬♢D, (2D ∨ (D&♢¬D)) ∨ ¬♢D and so on, depending on whether D takes respectively value t n in some alternative interpretations and in some other alternative interpretations it takes value t c ; D takes value t n in some alternative interpretations and in some others it takes value f i ; D takes value t c in some alternative interpretations and in some others it takes value f i ; D takes value t n in some alternative interpretations or it takes value t c in some other alternative interpretations, or it takes value f i in some other alternative interpretations. Then
Proof. Lemma is proved by recurrent mathematical induction on the number of occurrence of logical terms in formula D.
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